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Electronics — A Challenge to Auditors 
B Y R O B E R T G . W R I G H T 
PRINCIPAL, CHICAGO O F F I C E 
Presented before The Institute of Internal 
Auditors, Atlanta Chapter — December 1956 
What effect will electronic data processing have upon auditing 
procedures? Wil l some of our customary documents and records dis-
appear ? Should audit techniques include verification of machine pro-
grams ? Will internal control be strengthened or weakened by the tran-
sition to electronics ? In general, how much do we really have to know 
about electronic data processing to do an effective job of auditing? 
Answers to these and related questions are of concern to al l au-
ditors, internal or independent. The answers, of course, will be de-
veloped gradually as electronic installations become more prevalent. 
However, experience to date in auditing the new systems, although 
limited, provides clues to some of the ultimate answers. 
INTERNAL CONTROL 
Our consideration of the impact of electronic data processing will 
begin with a discussion of some of the broader aspects of internal 
control. 
Proper evaluation of internal control is a mandatory prerequisite 
to the issuance of an unqualified certificate by an independent public 
accountant. Similarly, internal control is uppermost in the mind of the 
internal auditor as he assists management in achieving efficient admin-
istration. Auditors, professional and corporate alike, are concerned 
with the effect that electronic data processing wil l have on established 
systems of internal control. 
A fundamental characteristic of a good system of internal control 
is an appropriate segregation of functional responsibiliites and duties. 
On the other hand, maximum utilization of the expensive electronic 
data-processing machines requires, in many instances, a so-called 
"consolidated functions" approach to processing. Thus, an electronic 
version of the "segregation versus integration" issue is at hand. 
To illustrate, in processing a sales order, the electronic equip-
ment might be programmed to determine the availability of stock, check 
the customer's credit status, prepare necessary shipping documents, 
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adjust the inventory records, issue a purchase order to replenish the 
stock if the new on-hand balance is below the reorder level, prepare the 
sales invoice, charge the customer's account, post the accounting dis-
tribution of the sale, and accumulate desired sales statistics. A l l of 
this would be done as one processing cycle through one or more passes 
of the transaction through the electronic machines. Two questions arise 
under such a "consolidated functions" approach: (1) Is internal control 
weakened by consolidating responsibilities previously assigned to in-
dependent departments? (2) Wil l personnel in the data-processing 
center have sufficient over-all knowledge of accounting requirements to 
effect an irregularity? 
Departmental segregation for internal-control purposes means 
that no operating department and no asset-custodian department should 
control its own accounting records. Thus, the basic functions of au-
thorizing a transaction, recording the transaction, and maintaining 
custody of resultant assets should be separated. It appears that the 
several activities of the accounting department can be consolidated 
under electronic processing without disturbing this separation of de-
partmental responsibilities. However, EDP, as electronic data pro-
cessing is often called, wil l very likely take over some of the paper-
work activities of the operating and custodian departments. So long as 
the activities mechanized relate to accounting or record-keeping, it 
again appears that the consolidation should not weaken control. 
The internal auditor is the logical person to determine that 
cross-checks between departments are maintained under EDP. Data 
processing may be centralized, but authorization and stewardship 
should remain independent of data processing. 
As an example, assume that a credit manager whose records are 
maintained on magnetic tape approves an increase in the credit limits 
of a particular customer. He could, of course, advise the machine 
operator of his intentions and the desired change could be made by 
direct keyboard modification of the master records. Obviously, this 
would provide no record of the authority for the change. The internal 
auditor should insist that such changes be authorized in writing. For 
example, the authorization could be recorded on a punched card. After 
processing, the approved card would be retained in the credit depart-
ment files. Similar requirement should be provided for processing 
changes in other master records that require file maintenance of this 
type. 
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Will personnel in the data-processing center have sufficient over-
al l knowledge of accounting requirements to effect an irregularity? 
Obviously, any person who programs a complete application will have 
such knowledge. But the principle of segregation can be applied to the 
duties of employees within the data-processing center. Programming, 
broadly speaking, comprises system design, block diagramming, coding 
of machine instructions, and testing. These activities can be segre-
gated. 
Installation of electronic equipment may increase the likelihood of 
collusion among employees to defraud the organization. There will be 
fewer employees involved in data processing; accordingly, fewer people 
need be involved in the scheme. 
How would an EDP operator, familiar with the over-all program-
ming of an application, perpetrate an irregularity, either through col-
lusion or through some weakness in control? Here are four possible 
methods: (1) manipulation of input media; (2) manipulation of externally 
stored program; (3) keyboard alteration of data stored in memory; and 
(4) keyboard modification of internally stored programs. 
Input media, such as punched cards or paper tape, could, in the 
absence of effective controls, be altered by the machine operator. In 
a file-maintenance type of application, he could alter either the trans-
action media or the media containing permanent or master records. 
For example, in a payroll application, he could increase the number of 
hours worked for a given employee or he could increase the rate of pay 
contained in the master personnel file. 
Machine instruction programs are usually stored on punched 
cards or on magnetic tape. If the programs are altered by the operator, 
the machine will become a reliable accomplice to his scheme. Similar-
ly, transactions, master data, and instructions can be modified by the 
operator during the processing of data by depressing appropriate keys 
on the control console. There wil l be no tell-tale erasure marks to 
trace alterations such as these. 
Such practices must be based upon some weakness in control if 
they are to be profitable to the operator. The auditor's responsibility 
is to determine that such weaknesses do not exist. To fulfill this re-
sponsibility he must have an adequate knowledge of control techniques, 
both mechanical and human. 
Let us consider these control techniques and related auditing 
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procedures under the following classifications: (1) input; (2) proces-
sing; and (3) output. 
INPUT 
Authenticity of Source Data 
In most electronic installations, source documents, such as time 
cards, vendor invoices, receiving reports, and material requisitions, 
will continue to serve as the raw material for the data-processing 
operations. The validity of resultant transactions wil l continue to be 
established by the auditor by customary procedures, since approvals 
and other evidence of regularity will be available in visible form. 
However, an auditing problem may exist even though the required 
source documents are on hand. The problem is that the documents may 
not be filed in a manner that facilitates post-auditing procedures. Un-
der so-called "off-line" or "batch" accounting methods, source docu-
ments are accumulated into batches comprising economic processing 
groups. Information from the documents is transcribed to an input 
medium, such as punched cards or magnetic tape, and may then be 
sorted mechanically into some desired sequence. The documents, how-
ever, may not be sorted, but retained in random sequence. This pro-
blem is not new; it exists in present punched-card applications. 
The problem may become more complex under so-called "in-line" 
or "continuous" accounting methods. Under this new approach, trans-
actions wil l be processed in random sequence immediately after they 
occur. There wil l be no delay while enough transactions are accumula-
ted to form an economic batch. The new concept of data processing is 
made possible through the recent development of random-access mem-
ory units that can store millions of characters. Data will flow into these 
systems in random order and on a continuous basis. Ledgers, files, 
and other internally-stored records will be up-dated immediately, and 
the status of each record wil l be available instantly to interested per-
sonnel through electronic interrogation. IBM's contributions to this 
field are the Ramac 305 and the Ramac 650. In announcing the ma-
chines, Thomas J . Watson, Jr . , President of IBM, said "Ramac equip-
ment wil l not only revolutionize punched-card accounting but also mag-
netic-tape accounting." 
Returning to our problem, it is apparent that since transactions 
wil l be processed in random sequence as they occur, sorting of source 
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documents may become an extra manual operation that some program-
mers will consider unnecessary. The auditor must therefore insist 
that the source documents be arranged and filed in a manner that will 
accommodate his verification of the results of data processing. 
There is another trend under way which may cause the auditor 
even more concern as to the validity of source data. This is the de-
velopment of devices which may completely eliminate certain source 
documents. In the retail field, so-called "point of sale" recording de-
vices could eliminate the traditional sales slips and cash-register tapes. 
In the industrial field, automatic production recorders may capture data, 
without reference to visible production tickets. Time cards may dis-
appear if employees punch in by inserting identification plates in time 
clocks which automatically record the arrival data on tape or other 
coded media. 
Fortunately (for auditors), little progress has been made in this 
direction to date. The trend is clear however. Development of devices 
which eliminate source documents will pose serious new problems in 
auditing techniques. New methods must be found of testing the validity 
of transactions that enter the data-processing pipeline. Equipment 
manufacturers wil l be encouraged to design their devices to produce 
source documents simultaneously with the capture of data in coded 
form. In some instances it may be necessary for the device or the 
computer to print the transactions for auditing purposes only. Perhaps 
the auditor will have to rely more heavily on observation in order to 
verify the authenticity of input media. 
Correctness of Input Media 
What control procedures can be applied to assure accurate tran-
scription of data from source documents to the computer's input medi-
um? Input media today consist of punched cards, paper tape, and 
magnetic tape. Behind these are such auxiliary machines as card-to-
tape converters, punched-card reproducers and transceivers, Teletype 
receivers, tape-to-card converters, and many others. However, in the 
final analysis al l input to electronic data-processing machines stems 
from an initial typing or keyboard operation. Accordingly, emphasis 
for control purposes must be placed on the typing or keyboard opera-
tions. 
Control procedures for the typing or keyboard operations will 
undoubtedly resemble those now used in punched-card installations. 
These include manual review of document coding, key-verification of 
348 
card punching, comparison of source documents with proof listings, and 
balancing to independently determined batch totals. In one electronic 
system, magnetic tape can be coded directly with a typewriter. A 
separate typewriter is then used to verify the original coding. 
The most effective way to assure accuracy is to eliminate un-
necessary typing or keyboard operations, by mechanizing as much of 
the transcription work as possible. Many new devices are available 
for this purpose. Under the concept of integrated data processing, 
typewriters, adding machines, cash registers, and bookkeeping ma-
chines are equipped to prepare paper tapes or punched cards as a by-
product of the preparation of an original document or record. The cor-
rectness of the coded media is established by inspecting the information 
typed on the document or record. Pre-coding of documents, such as the 
magnetic ink coding of checks as advocated by banks, will eliminate 
subsequent keyboard operations. Scanning devices will eliminate human 
transcription by reading information imprinted by Addressograph plates 
and otherwise. A more common example is the use of pre-punched 
cards which are prepared by reproducing verified master cards. A l l 
of these devices and techniques eliminate manual transcription and 
therefore increase the accuracy of computer input data. 
Completeness of Input Data 
One question remains regarding input. What controls are neces-
saryto ensure processing of al l transactions that should be processed? 
Again we find the answer in present controls for punched-card systems. 
Source documents should be prepared by a department other than 
the data-processing department. They should be retained in the origi-
nating department and filed in a sequence that wil l facilitate identifica-
tion with related records or documents prepared by the data-processing 
machines. 
Batch totals or other control totals should be established by the 
originating department and subsequently traced to the data-processing 
results. Where such totals are inapplicable, documents or cards for-
warded for processing should be controlled by pre-determined item 
counts or "hash" totals. For example, one company, which maintains 
a network of telephone lines for its IBM Transceivers, establishes 
card-counts for data transmitted to its EDP center. Cards automatic-
ally reproduced at the center are counted for agreement with the pre-
determined counts. Other control techniques are apparent. For exam-
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pie, source documents should be pre-numbered and the numerical se-
quence accounted for by the originating department. 
PROCESSING 
So far we have discussed various controls to establish the au-
thenticity, correctness, and completeness of data entering an electronic 
system. In general, the control techniques are carry-overs from those 
found in punched-card systems and require only limited knowledge of 
electronic techniques on the part of an auditor. But the responsibility 
of the internal auditor does not stop short of the machine room. He 
must also evaluate controls within the EDP center. He must make 
certain that machine errors wil l be detected and that processing pro-
cedures produce the results intended. 
Accuracy in electronic data processing is dependent upon two things: 
Machine reliability and adequacy of human planning and control. The lat-
ter includes programmed control and equipment maintenance policies. 
Machine Reliability 
We can approach the matter of machine reliability with the com-
forting knowledge that electronic equipment as such is the most ac-
curate tool yet developed for this purpose. The readability and storage 
ability of magnetic tape has now been verified by field usage. Internal-
ly, the machines have already amassed remarkable records of error-
free performance. 
Accuracy is really a matter of detecting errors. The extent of 
circuitry built into the equipment for this purpose varies from one 
make to another. In fact, the need for checking circuits is hotly debated 
by competing machine manufacturers because each additional circuit 
increases the cost of the system. 
One type of an error-detection circuit is designed to check the 
data at various stages as it moves from one place to another within the 
equipment. It starts with parity-check bits placed on the magnetic tape 
by the recording mechanism. As the bits forming a coded character 
speed through the system they pass checking stations watching for 
missing bits. Error signals flash on the console unit when a character 
does not make sense to the machine. Since some errors are intermit-
tent in nature, the machine, through programming, may reread the in-
valid character. If the error persists, the machine, again at the option 
of the programmer, will come to a sudden halt. 
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Some systems employ duplicate circuitry for arithmetic computa-
tions, whereby al l calculations are automatically computed twice and 
compared. Other techniques used include those to detect invalid in-
structions, overflow conditions in an accumulator, and errors in tape 
writing, card punching, and printing. 
The internal auditor's responsibility is to become familiar with 
the built-in controls of the particular system used in his company. He 
must do this in order to know what controls should be provided through 
programming. 
Programmed Control 
The various types of self-checking features that are built into the 
machines are important to the auditor. Of equal importance is the pos-
sibility of detecting errors by so-called "program checks." 
A program check is included in the machine's internally stored 
instructions. For example, the machine may be told to verify the re-
sults of one operation before proceeding to the next. Opportunities for 
using these checks are virtually unlimited. In some instances, the 
checks are "free", in that additional machine time is either negligible 
or ni l . In other instances, such as when the machine does not have 
enough storage capacity to store the checking instructions, verification 
may require an additional pass of the transactions through the ma-
chines. Thus, the limiting factor in programming a check is really a 
matter of economics — is the cost of the check proportionate to the 
losses which would result if the errors are not detected? 
The internal auditor's responsibility is to determine that needed 
checks that can be justified economically are included in the machine 
programs. Obviously, all operations need not be verified, for a sur-
prisingly large percentage of electronically produced accounting results 
can be substantiated by reference to independent data. 
Here are some actual examples taken from electronic applications 
currently in use by some of the clients of our F i rm: 
A payroll program provides for proving the computation of the 
net pay of each employee. After the original computation is 
made, the deductions are added back and the new total must 
equal the original gross pay. 
Another payroll program provides for a duplicate accumulation 
of daily earnings to develop weekly totals, for individual em-
ployees and for each department. The check is considered to be 
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fool-proof and has eliminated the manual recapitulation pre-
viously done by the payroll department. 
One program tests the operating accuracy of the computer im-
mediately after each important calculation. The machine com-
putes a programmed arithmetic exercise which should produce 
a zero amount. If zero does not result, the arithmetical unit is 
not functioning properly and the machine is programmed to stop. 
One payroll program provides for a comparison of computed 
piecework earnings with predetermined maximums. Checks of 
this type are known as reasonableness tests. 
Several payroll programs verify withholding tax computations on 
an over-all basis, based upon an accumulation of individual 
earnings and exemptions. Over-all proofs of this type are re-
liable and economical. 
Frequently it is expedient to use standard punched-card machines 
to check the work of an electronic machine. In a billing application, for 
example, a summary card containing computed invoice totals may be 
punched by the electronic machine. The invoices may be printed on a 
standard accounting machine from header cards and detail item cards, 
also punched by the electronic machine. The accounting machine could 
be wired to accumulate invoice totals and, using the well-known zero-
balance method, determine that the totals agree with those previously 
punched into the summary card by the electronic machine. 
In addition to verifying the accuracy of machine calculations, 
other types of program checks are usually necessary. Through the use 
of coded identification labels on each reel of magnetic tape, the machine 
can be programmed to determine that the manual chore of mounting the 
proper reel on the proper tape unit is performed correctly. Self-
checking circuits may detect certain machine errors. However, unless 
properly programmed, the errors will not be printed out or otherwise 
brought to the operator's attention. During processing it may be neces-
sary to transfer the contents of internal memory to a "check-point" 
tape so that if an error is subsequently detected the work can be backed 
up to that proven point. 
Programmers frequently have a tendency to ignore the use of du-
plicate computations and similar program checks. They have a pro-
found respect for the inherent accuracy of electronic hardware. They 
work feverishly just to develop a program that will do the required job. 
Accordingly, they consider certain program checks to be extra work 
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and of little or no value. Machine salesmen frequently share these 
views. These attitudes merely emphasize the need for a review of ma-
chine programs by the internal auditor. 
As mentioned earlier, a console operator could, through some 
weakness in internal control or through collusion, introduce or modify 
both data and programs in an unauthorized manner. The auditor may 
suggest certain controls to minimize such activities. He might suggest 
that operating responsibility be fixed by requiring that al l elapsed ma-
chine time be recorded in a control register showing the names of per-
sonnel responsible. He might suggest a rotation plan for the work of 
data-processing personnel. Under this plan, a console operator would 
have to permanently conceal an irregularity before turning the records 
over to his successor. 
The auditor should also determine that provision is made for the 
reconstruction of data in the event of fire or accidental mutilation. 
Certain records on magnetic tape can be reconstructed from the intro-
ductory medium, such as punched cards. Here, the cards should be re-
tained in a safe place until the possible need for reconstruction has 
expired. Other tape records, such as a perpetual inventory, cannot be 
reconstructed readily. In these cases, the auditor may suggest that the 
tapes be prepared in duplicate. 
Maintenance Policies 
In addition to built-in checking circuits and programmed verif i-
cation, accuracy of processing depends upon the adequacy of mainte-
nance activities. 
When an electronic system is purchased, maintenance can be 
performed by customer personnel or by manufacturer's personnel on a 
contract basis. When the system is leased, maintenance by the manu-
facturer is usually included in the rental charge. 
In one installation of a large-scale electronic data-processing 
system, the manufacturer has assigned a crew of six engineers to 
maintain the equipment. Four of these men work from 7:30 in the 
morning until 4:30 in the afternoon. The other two men work from 9:30 
AM to 6:30 PM. One hour is devoted to preventive maintenance at the 
beginning of each day. Problems are fed into the system which test 
every possible machine command and the operating condition of tape 
drives, the arithmetical unit, core memory, auxiliary drum memory, 
and other units. A "high-low" voltage test is applied to detect mar-
ginal functioning of tubes and circuits. After the equipment is turned 
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over to the customer, the engineers subject available units of equipment 
to more comprehensive testing. Rigid schedules are followed which 
provide for periodic complete inspections of al l components. Thus, 
some components are inspected monthly, others quarterly or annually, 
according to the manufacturer's specifications. 
As installations become more prevalent, it is conceivable that a 
scarcity of competent engineers may force some manufacturers to 
curtail certain customer maintenance programs. When customers 
provide their own maintenance, it is not uncommon to find a wide de-
viation from the maintenance policies recommended by the manufac-
turer. For these reasons, the adequacy of maintenance practices 
should be investigated. 
A l l of this is not to imply that an internal auditor must become 
and electrical engineer. However, it appears that his responsibilities 
might include: determining whether preventive maintenance schedules 
comply with manufacturer's recommendations; and determining whether 
adequate records of errors and machine down-time are kept and an-
alyzed by reason. 
OUTPUT 
Having considered some of the problems of input and processing, 
let us now turn our thoughts to the output of electronic data-processing 
machines. 
Customary controls should be exercised over records, reports, 
and documents prepared by an electronic data-processing system. In a 
payroll application, for example, numerical accountability should be 
kept of payroll checks, responsibility for the supply of blank checks 
should be fixed, use of the signature plate should be regulated, and the 
distribution of al l forms and records should be controlled. 
The challenging problems, so far as output is concerned, involves 
information that is not printed, rather than what is printed. 
Printed output is used externally by customers or other outside 
groups, or it is used internally. External output, such as invoices to 
customers, payroll checks, and shipping notices, may always be neces-
sary in some printed form. But internal output, in the form of visible 
records, may, in some instances, be eliminated. 
Management by exception, as applied to electronic data-process-
ing systems, means that only those items requiring human action or 
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attention should be printed in report form — all other detail would re-
main in coded form in some storage medium or device. This is, indeed, 
a challenge to auditors, for we need, or at least we think we need, our 
familiar journals, intermediate works sheets, ledgers, detailed tr ial 
balances, and the like. 
We must not retard the trend toward exception reporting simply 
because customary auditing procedures can not be applied. Manage-
ment by exception is a useful technique. Through it, the electronic 
machines can relieve management and lesser personnel of many routine 
decision-making chores. Through it, the great potential usefulness of 
the flexible machines can be realized. We must criticize the technique 
only after we have found that it is impracticable effectively to audit the 
system by any method. 
We may never reach the point where an auditor must serve as a 
constant watchdog, continuously assigned to the observation of input, 
processing, and output of a completely automatic system. However, we 
must determine our auditing requirements for each new application in 
this rapidly changing field of data processing. 
Under EDP, the files and permanent records of several depart-
ments may be consolidated. For example, a consolidated stock record 
may be stored on magnetic tape or in a large-capacity internal storage 
device. Processing of transactions would, in a single pass, up-date the 
records of, say, production control, purchasing, inventory control, and 
cost accounting. If the transactions are normal and the adjusted rec-
ords require no human attention, the program might not provide for a 
print out of an audit trai l . In such cases, the auditor may be justified 
in insisting upon the printing of a chronological record showing the 
manner in which the transactions are processed. After al l , auditing is 
necessary and must be accommodated at times even though preparation 
of audit media requires additional machine time. 
In lieu of a continuous printing of transactions, the auditor may 
find a substitute procedure. He may request that the audit trail be 
written only on magnetic tape. The reels of tape could be filed for a 
reasonable period of time. The auditor could then select certain reels 
and have the information thereon printed for test-checking purposes. 
Or, the auditor may devise a set of representative transactions for his 
testing purposes. The transactions could be either real or fictitious, 
with predetermined processing results. The auditor could then run 
these transactions through the electronic machines and compare com-
355 
puted results with the known results. This would enable the auditor to 
pass judgment on the effectiveness of the machine's stored program. 
In some instances, the policy of reporting exceptions only may 
be helpful to auditors, rather than a problem. Through statistical 
sampling the machine may select items for his tests. The machine 
could then test these items for him, leaving a visible record for the 
bulk of the transactions in comparatively short order. He could then 
turn his attention to the exceptional items which are printed out and 
which deserve more of the auditor's time in the first place. 
OTHER IMPLICATIONS 
The auditor's review of the internal control and auditing implica-
tions of an electronic application preferably should be done several 
months before the new system is placed into actual operation. If his 
review discloses need for additional controls, the required program-
ming or other changes can be made more easily at this stage. 
During his review, the auditor should devise a check-list for 
evaluating subsequent applications. He should revise his former audit 
program to give effect to changes caused by the electronic system. He 
may develop scientific sampling techniques and other means of utilizing 
the machine for his auditing purposes. He should arrange for special 
print-outs that will be required for audit purposes at a later date. 
Conversion to electronic data processing will necessitate careful 
planning on the part of the auditor. For example, the auditor may wish 
to confirm customers' accounts receivable as of some future date. His 
preliminary review may disclose that the system does not provide for 
printing periodic tr ial balances. He must then allow ample time for 
preparation of a program which would cause the machine to print out 
the trial balances as of the specified date. The trial balance will be 
available only at that date because the balances will change when suc-
ceeding transactions are processed. 
SUMMARY 
How much do we really have to know about electronic data pro-
cessing to do an effective job of auditing? This was our original ques-
tion. Perhaps the answer can be developed by summarizing the points 
previously mentioned. 
As to the broader aspects of internal control, it appears that the 
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auditor should, with no specific training in EDP, be able to determine 
the adequacy of cross-checks between departments. He can determine 
that the basic functions of authorizing, recording, and asset-custodian-
ship are segregated. 
On the other hand, specific training in electronic data processing 
usually will be necessary if the auditor is to determine whether a pro-
per segregation of duties exists within the data-processing department. 
He must know the mechanics of altering data and machine instructions 
if he is to determine the opportunities for irregularity afforded to the 
operators, individually or through collusion. 
Without additional training, the auditor should be able to establish 
the authenticity of source documents and to determine that they are filed 
in a manner that facilitates auditing. However, in the event certain 
documents are discontinued as a result of automation, knowledge of 
machine capabilities wil l be very helpful to the auditor. He could then 
suggest practical means for providing an adequate audit trail. 
Without additional training, the auditor should also be able to ap-
praise the control of typing and other keyboard operations. The control 
methods are designed to assure accuracy of input media and are the 
same as those now used in punched-card systems. Elimination of repe-
titive typing through integrated data-processing techniques merely s im-
plifies this control area. 
Similarly, the auditor should, with no additional training, be able 
to appraise the controls to ensure processing of al l valid transactions. 
Batch-totals, card-counts, hash-totals, prenumbering, and other tech-
niques of documentary control are familiar procedures that will be 
continued. 
However, the auditor very definitely will need specific training 
in order to determine that built-in error-detection devices are pro-
perly utilized. 
Similarly, the auditor must understand the rudiments of program-
ming if he is to determine which phases of an application should and can 
be verified through use of program checks. 
Specific knowledge wil l also be necessary in order for the auditor 
to determine whether provision is made for reconstructing data in the 
event of fire or mutilation. 
The auditor's review of maintenance policies will also require 
basic machine training. 
Technical knowledge wil l most certainly be needed when journals, 
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ledgers, and other internal records give way to invisibly coded tapes 
or memory devices within a machine. We must develop new auditing 
techniques if we are to keep pace with the new processing techniques. 
CONCLUSION 
Many traditional auditing procedures will not be changed by the 
introduction of electronic data-processing machines. Most of our pro-
cedures will continue to be performed independently of machine opera-
tions, by verifying processing results through reference to source 
document or by other customary practices. However, some auditing 
techniques wil l change, and some of them may change drastically. 
Audit trails and control requirements are just as essential under 
electronic data processing as they are under any other system. 
Efficiency of data processing is a desirable goal; but this goal must not 
be realized at a sacrifice of necessary controls and auditability. 
The internal auditor, in many instances, wil l be the logical person 
to appraise the control and auditing aspects of electronic machine ap-
plications. To do this he must first prepare himself. Preparation wil l 
require considerable effort, but it need not be viewed as a Herculean 
project. Most of the mysteries associated with the gigantic machines 
will be dispelled in the first programming course. 
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